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and Renaissance philosophy. Sadly, this is the only chapter in the book 
that addresses this aspect of Lewis’s thought. Thankfully, Muth does it ex-
cellently by examining Lewis’s use of ancient and medieval bestiaries and 
connecting this with the Augustinian sacramental tradition in philosophi-
cal theology. A sacramental view, he argues, rescues individual creations 
from the ontological erasure that follows from so many other versions 
of metaphysics. Muth is not sanguine about the future of beauty in mar-
ketplace-driven academia, but Lewis’s writing provides a hopeful—and 
beautiful—alternative to the current intellectual environment.
In the final chapter, Gregory Bassham, in his typically lucid style, makes 
a quick case for the importance of fantasy, not only for the imagination, 
but also for Christian philosophy. In a nutshell, Bassham argues for the 
important role fantastic literature plays in helping us to see familiar things 
from a new angle—which is, after all, one of the chief aims of philosophy.
I have two criticisms of this book. First, I found myself correcting the 
index quite a lot, penciling in important references that were omitted. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, the book left me wanting more. Lewis devoted 
a good deal of his writing to arguing with philosophers like Spencer and 
Nietzsche. Other philosophers like Bergson and Bernardus Silvestris per-
meate Lewis’s writing. Yet none of these figures is mentioned in the book. 
Even if Lewis wasn’t a philosopher in some narrow sense, he constantly 
engaged figures like these from the history of philosophy, and surely that 
merits mention in a volume of this sort. Or perhaps it merits mention in 
a second volume. After all, taken together these essays make a solid case 
for considering Lewis a philosopher. If that is the case, then there may be 
a good deal more Lewisian philosophical writing to come.
This book should be on the shelf of every college library, and will make 
a helpful addition to classes on the philosophy of Lewis. 
Transforming Philosophy and Religion: Love’s Wisdom, ed. Norman Wirzba 
and Bruce Ellis Benson. Indiana University Press, 2008. viii + 263 pp.
N. N. TRAKAKIS, Monash University and Deakin University
The usual practice in philosophical discussions on love has been to be-
gin with certain reflections or theories on love and then to apply these or 
test them against various domains such as politics and gender relations. 
This volume reverses this process by looking at how our very theoretical 
or reflective practices, philosophy and theology included, can be trans-
formed by the discipline of love. The very etymology of ‘philosophy,’ in 
fact, presupposes that the attainment of wisdom requires the practice of 
love in some form. Philosophers, as the editors note in their Introduction, 
have tended to sever the connection between love and wisdom, seeing the 
former as an impediment to the attainment of the latter (love as a passion 
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that distorts reality). But could not love lay open to view vital and valu-
able aspects of the world that a detached and impersonal stance would 
(inevitably) overlook? Although this is certainly the case, if modern psy-
chology has anything to teach us, we need to recognize that love distorts 
just as much as it reveals, for love comes in many forms, from the parental 
to the romantic, from the narcissistic to the agapaic.
I would have liked to see this issue addressed more thoroughly, a point 
to which I will return. Nonetheless the essays collected here, which arose 
from the Wisdom of Love conference organized by the Society for Conti-
nental Philosophy and Theology at Wheaton College in March 2005, make 
a splendid contribution to the philosophy of love. Unable here to deal ad-
equately with the variety and complexity of the collection, I will comment 
only on those essays which I found most provocative.
Norman Wirzba’s essay (“The Primacy of Love”) calls upon philoso-
phers to acknowledge the primacy of love, for love “is the indispensable 
prerequisite for wisdom. If we do not exhibit appropriate forms of love, 
our access to wisdom will be seriously impaired if not altogether denied” 
(pp. 15–16). It is, of course, a perennial temptation of the philosopher that 
he or she can proceed with their craft without attending to the practice 
of love and the attendant disciplines of self-purification and detachment. 
Wirzba’s emphasis on the dangers of this temptation is welcome, but what 
would have been welcome also is an examination of the dangers of love, 
beginning with an analysis of the various forms love has taken in the past 
as well as in today’s virtual and market-driven worlds. Wirzba admits that 
“What love itself is, of course, is not easily or simply determined,” and that 
“love is a varied and complex phenomenon that should not be narrowly 
or quickly reduced to one thing” (p. 16). But it seems that this is precisely 
what Wirzba does when, only one paragraph later, he goes on to say that, 
“Though love flowers into many different forms, at root a loving disposi-
tion is one that acknowledges, affirms, and nurtures (human and nonhu-
man) others in their ability to be” (p. 16). Similarly, a few paragraphs later 
Wirzba discusses the familiar mystical view that our rational faculties are 
constrained by the power of sin (sloth, pride, etc.) while loves heals the root 
of sin and nurtures practical goodness—without, however, noticing that 
love may also be open to, and constrained by, the same vices. I found this to 
be a glaring omission in the volume generally, and even when the dangers 
of love are acknowledged, little is provided by way of detailed analysis. 
For example, B. Keith Putt’s essay, “A Love that B(l)inds,” discusses the 
theme that love is blind, and notes that “such blindness provokes a certain 
epistemological crisis of love in that the lover may not genuinely know the 
beloved, or know if the beloved genuinely reciprocates that love, or even 
know whether he or she genuinely loves the beloved” (p. 122). However, 
Putt does not delve into the details of such dangers, preferring instead to 
show how this blindness in love creates the necessity for faith and hope.
Bertha Alvarez Manninen, in her contribution (“Why There Is No Either/ 
Or in Works of Love”), notes that Kierkegaard’s Works of Love is sometimes 
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interpreted as a rejection of preferential love—which is directed only to 
those we are close to, and is conditional on our feelings and preferences 
and so is fleeting and subject to change—in favor of unconditional love 
or Christian agape—which is universal in scope, as it is grounded in the 
divine commandment to love all humanity and so is not subject to change 
or termination. But Manninen sees this as a misrepresentation of Kierkeg-
aard, who is best viewed as valuing both forms of love and not requiring 
us to choose between them. In support of her position, Manninen defers to 
Kantian moral philosophy. Kant is often criticized for not allowing moral 
actions to be motivated by any inclinations or feelings, but in response it 
has been noted that (for Kant) an action has moral worth as long as it is 
determined by the motive of duty, and any accompanying inclinations or 
nonmoral motives do not negate the moral worth of the action but simply 
overdetermine the action. Similarly, for Kierkegaard (argues Manninen), 
preferential feelings do not negate genuine love, as long as the ultimate 
motivating factor for love is the divine duty to love all humankind, in 
which case any preferential feelings would only overdetermine the loving 
relationship. Thus, “what Kierkegaard wants to abolish is not preference, 
but rather love based on preference” (p. 97).
The preference for nonpreferential love seems to lie not merely in the 
capacity of this kind of love to embrace all of humanity, but also in its 
stability and security: nothing can possibly tear it asunder. This indeed 
is the kind of love extolled in the apostle Paul’s memorable words in 
Romans 8: 38–39: “For I am convinced that neither death nor life, neither 
angels nor demons, neither the present nor the future, nor any powers, 
neither height nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, will be able to 
separate us from the love of God that is in Christ Jesus our Lord” (NIV). 
And so, if inclinations or feelings of preference are taken to be integral 
elements in a loving relationship, then since such inclinations or feelings 
can whither away and disappear, so can the loving relationship itself. 
But to therefore demote the affectual and passional dimensions of love 
to ‘overdetermining factors’ seems to me too drastic a measure. A more 
cautious and nuanced approach would see the emotions and passions as 
an indispensable element in (genuine) love, but would ask the question: 
what kinds of emotions and passions are thereby demanded? The sort 
that quickly and easily fade away in difficult circumstances, or the sort 
that are the product of long and hard ascesis (prayer, commitment, etc.)? 
This would then overcome the (good) objection the author deals with in 
her final footnote, that if love is not based on preference all of our loving 
relationships would be ‘equalized,’ since I would have no more reason to 
prefer or value the love of my wife over the love of my female neighbor. 
Manninen responds by saying that the feelings of preference that over-
determine my love for my wife will serve to make my experience phe-
nomenologically different from the love I feel for any of my neighbors, 
and this difference would render my relationship with my wife valuable 
and irreplaceable. But what if these feelings were to wither away? This 
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Manninen takes to be a live possibility, but if so then my wife is replace-
able after all.
John Caputo, in “Living by Love: A Quasi-Apostolic Carte Postale on 
Love in Itself, If There Is Such a Thing,” engages in a dialogue with the 
apostle Paul on love and its relation to the law. He begins with a phenom-
enological account of love, where love is described as an excess which 
leaps over and overrides the law, in which case “we need the law in order 
to have something to exceed” (p. 104). Among a long list of contrasts be-
tween love and the law, Caputo writes: “Laws are numerable—ten more 
or less, in several versions—but love is a single virtue that is everywhere 
itself yet everywhere diversified” (p. 104). Caputo, like many other con-
tributors to this collection (Gschwandtner and Anderson being the major 
exceptions), falls into the trap of thinking that love is a unitary phenom-
enon, albeit one that is manifested in diverse ways. But why must love be 
one and not many? Why cannot love itself be made up of different kinds 
and varieties, with some varieties closely related to each other and others 
only tenuously so? Why, in other words, must we continue to assume that 
there is an essence or ideal form of love, rather than a plurality of loves, 
some better and some worse than others? Indeed, this seems to be a more 
phenomenologically adequate account of love.
In the final section of the paper, Caputo offers a deconstructive reading 
of love. On this reading, we can never be sure that love in itself, which is 
not deconstructible, exists or has finally been found; and we must always 
be wary of any actual manifestation of love posing as (pure) love in itself, 
for love has its ruses and we can never be sure that it is merely a disguised 
form of (e.g.) power or pride. This struck me as a significant point but an 
underdeveloped one, and perhaps greater depth could have been achieved 
by delving into the wealth of psychological literature on love—something 
that is only occasionally done by the contributors to this volume.
The mere fact that love can so easily—and unfortunately often does—
turn to hate, leading people to do the unthinkable (viz., killing their loved 
ones in ‘crimes of passion’), should at least lead one to be wary of any 
psychologically naïve conception of love. A charge of this sort has indeed 
been leveled at Caputo in the past. Gregg Lambert, for example, has ar-
gued that the concept of love Caputo has inherited from Christianity is 
deeply problematic, both morally and psychologically. Borrowing from 
psychoanalytic theory, Lambert argued that the intensity and excessive 
demands (for reciprocation) that characterize love are the very conditions 
that make possible the excessive cruelty that characterizes hatred.1 Caputo 
in turn replied that any inventory of love’s stratagems and ruses, such as 
that provided by Lambert’s ‘cold hermeneutics’ of love, need not undo 
love altogether. The challenge, Caputo emphasizes both in his reply to 
Lambert and in his contribution to the book under review, is to know that 
1See Gregg Lambert, “Against Religion (Without Religion): A New Rationalist Reply 
to John D. Caputo’s On Religion,” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 5.2 (April 2004): 
20–36.
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love in itself is impossible, to be fully aware of the ruses and risks of love, 
and then still to make the leap of love. The challenge is to move within this 
aporia, to negotiate this double bind of love, and not simply to denounce 
all ecomonies or attempt to dissolve them.2
But it seems that Caputo is faced with the following dilemma: Either 
love does occasionally escape the economy of exchange, or love never es-
capes the economy. If the former is the case, then Caputo has in effect 
abandoned the Derridean deconstructive project, where ‘the uncondition-
al’ (whether in the guise of love or something else, such as justice or hospi-
tality) is always to come (à venir), forever lying beyond our reach. And if the 
latter is the case, then we may wonder: Why bother? Why bother striving 
for something that can never be actualized? Caputo’s call to ‘love without 
demand (for anything in return)’ becomes an impossible and hence futile 
task, for no matter how hard we may try we are inevitably led back to 
the circle of exchange. Our predicament is therefore no better than that 
of Sisyphus. Caputo may, of course, reply that we should bother because 
we can try to approximate this ideal as far as we can, even if we can never 
fully attain it. But I wonder, like Lambert, what sense can be made of the 
idealized notion of ‘love in itself,’ a notion that is so detached from history 
and its complications and multiple meanings that it seems to spiral away 
into nothingness, if not nonsense.
Brian Treanor, in “Absence Makes the Heart Grow Fonder,” is also 
critical of postmodern, and in particular deconstructive, accounts of love, 
viewing them as deriving from faulty assumptions about otherness. If 
deconstruction is love for the other, it is not love construed in terms of 
intimacy and union (as it is in the Christian and Neoplatonic traditions), 
but love figured as difference and distance, as respect for the otherness of 
the other, an otherness construed in terms of absolute alterity. Against such 
notions of love and otherness, Treanor makes some telling points. Treanor 
quotes Dostoevsky to the effect that, “the more I love mankind in general, 
the less I love people in particular” (p. 147). Deconstruction, similarly, en-
joins a love for otherness, but fails to love any actual or particular others, 
for as Treanor explains, “as soon as the other is present, she is no lon-
ger tout autre and thus, strictly speaking, no longer the object of my love” 
(p. 147). This reminded me of a Russian Orthodox priest in Moscow who, 
in response to the flippant (but attributed) comment of astronaut Yury 
Gagarin that he traveled to the heavens but never saw God, remarked: “If 
you have not seen Him on earth, you will never see Him in Heaven.”3 The 
singular and the concrete is where love (and love of God) is found.
Treanor’s solution to the problems with deconstructive love is to reha-
bilitate the notion of otherness by, firstly, affirming the irreducible alter-
ity of every other (so that otherness is not merely relative), and secondly, 
2See John D. Caputo, “Love Among the Deconstructibles: A Response to Gregg Lambert,” 
Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 5.2 (April 2004): 37–57.
3Quoted in Anthony Bloom, Beginning to Pray (New York: Paulist Press, 1970), 45.
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rejecting the hyperbole of absolute otherness, for there can be no relation-
ship or communication with an other that is wholly other. Treanor thus 
offers a ‘hermeneutic-chiastic’ understanding of otherness: “while there 
may be some aspects of the other that are foreign and even absolutely 
obscure to the self, these aspects exist alongside others that are in some 
measure familiar” (p. 150)—a far more reasonable view in comparison 
with the excesses of deconstruction.
Tyler Roberts, in “Militant Love: Zizek and the Christian Legacy,” ex-
plores Zizek’s ‘turn to agape,’ his idea that Christian love is the key to radi-
cal politics. This turn, explains Roberts, is theorized in terms of a radical 
change, a revolutionary break inaugurating a new symbolic order, first 
conceptualized by the apostle Paul, where excessive agape releases us from 
the repressive economy of desire and law. Although Zizek thus defers 
to the Christian legacy, his underlying concern is political: his goal is to 
provide a model of political commitment to a ‘cause,’ and he thinks that 
Christian love (which he describes as intolerant and violent) helps pro-
vide such a model. But here Roberts detects a problematic valorization 
of violence, and I share Roberts’s concerns. Consider the following quote 
from The Puppet and the Dwarf (reproduced on p. 178):
Who is really alive today? What if we are “really alive” only if and when we 
engage ourselves with an excessive intensity which puts us beyond “mere 
life”? What if, when we focus on mere survival, even if it is qualified as 
“having a good time”, what we ultimately lose is life itself? . . . What makes 
life “worth living” is the very excess of life: the awareness that there is some-
thing for which we are ready to risk our life (we may call this excess “free-
dom”, “honor”, “dignity”, “autonomy”, etc.).
Even more revealing is the following rhetorical question which occurs 
where I have placed the ellipses in the above quotation: “What if the Pal-
estinian suicide bomber on the point of blowing himself (and others) up 
is, in an emphatic sense, ‘more alive’ than the American soldier engaged in 
a war in front of a computer screen hundreds of miles away from the en-
emy?” I find this a disturbing question. As I write, Palestinians and Israelis 
are once again slaughtering each other in the Gaza Strip, and I wonder 
whether these soldiers, freedom fighters, terrorists (call them what you 
will) are “really alive,” or whether life has become for both sides of this 
conflict (as in all wars) cheap and expendable, in the name of a ‘higher 
cause.’ In other words, Zizek’s simple conflation of “life worth living” 
with “the very excess of life” is just that: simple to the point of being sim-
plistic. If excess can render life worthwhile, it can just as easily reduce it to 
meaninglessness (consider drug addiction). While Zizek may be right in 
decrying the lack of firm belief or commitment in the postmodern world, 
a more balanced approach would be to develop, as Roberts puts it, “a 
politics between resistance and order” (p. 182).
Christina Gschwandtner, in “Love as a Declaration of War?,” contin-
ues with the theme of militant love, but this time as it occurs in the work 
of Jean-Luc Marion. Marion frequently compares love to war, and this 
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raises for Gschwandtner several suspicions about Marion’s phenomenol-
ogy of love. Marion writes, for example, that a declaration of love is like 
a declaration of war in being beyond reason and calculation, and in being 
performative and not descriptive, initiating a total commitment and aban-
donment of any hope of returning to the equilibrium of exchange. Marion 
adds that the language of love also parallels—and indeed can only be ex-
pressed by means of—the language of mystical theology, and that love is 
univocal insofar as all types of love (including divine and human love) 
function in the same way. Gschwandtner highlights the problematic, if not 
extreme, character of these aspects of Marion’s recent work, concluding 
that Marion’s love “just seems a bit too overwhelming” (p. 195).
I was reminded of a play I recently saw, called Grace and co-written 
by the philosopher and critic of religion A. C. Grayling. In this play, a 
young man has a religious awakening and decides to become a priest, to 
the bewilderment of his skeptical parents and girlfriend. He nevertheless 
persists in his decision to follow his calling and shortly after asking his 
girlfriend to marry him he is killed by religious fundamentalists. His girl-
friend, who is as unsure about the marriage proposal as she is about God, 
is devastated by the death of her partner, whom she clearly loved greatly. 
In anger she protests that love, the love (of God) that killed her partner 
and the love (of her partner) that is killing her, is just too much to bear, too 
overwhelming, too blind and too violent. Her solution: kindness. Kind-
ness is measured, thoughtful, not spiteful and not liable to abuse. I left 
the play wondering whether kindness, and not the violent torrents of love 
depicted by Zizek and Marion, is what religiously inclined philosophers 
should be advocating today. 
Alone in the World?: Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology, by J. Wentzel 
van Huyssteen. University of Edinburgh, 2004. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerd-
mans, 2006. 347 pp. $40.00
KEVIN SHARPE, Oxford University
For this book, van Huyssteen won in 2007 the first Andrew Murray-Des-
mond Tutu Prize for the Best Christian and Theological book by a South 
African. Van Huyssteen has held the James I. McCord Chair of Theology 
and Science at Princeton Theological Seminary since 1992, and deserves 
congratulations on his interdisciplinary scholarship; it is important to con-
tribute to the interaction between theology (however conceived) and sci-
ence (whatever branch).
The book discusses human uniqueness from both theological and scientific 
points of view. “We are indeed alone [van Huyssteen concludes], formed 
by biological processes such as natural selection yet, unlike all other species 
. . . we alone appear to have attained the capacity for self-consciousness and 
